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Illusions of Victory

Avoiding Nation-Building:
From Nixon to Trump
Dominic Tierney
©2018 Dominic Tierney

ABSTRACT: This article explores how the aversion to nationbuilding, a consistent theme in post-Vietnam foreign policy doctrine,
has shaped military operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq,
and beyond.

A

core element in the emerging foreign policy doctrine of
President Donald Trump is the desire to use force effectively
while also avoiding prolonged nation-building operations. In
August 2016, Trump promised to “crush and destroy” the Islamic State
as well as “decimate al-Qaeda.” 1 But if Trump intended to seize the
sword, he would also cast aside the shovel, “the era of nation-building
will be ended.” 2 In March 2017, Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson said
America’s number one goal in the Middle East was to “defeat ISIS.” But he
added, “we are not in the business of nation-building or reconstruction.” 3
The Trump administration sought to reconcile these goals through a
kinetic posture that shifted spending away from the State Department,
foreign aid, United Nations peacekeeping efforts, and other programs
integral to stabilization missions, and toward big-ticket hardware and
symbols of American might, such as aircraft carriers.4
The challenge of employing military operations to further US
interests and values while averting protracted nation-building has
been a fundamental dilemma for policymakers since at least the era of
Southern Reconstruction after the Civil War. Nation-building—the use
of US troops to strengthen a regime and create order inside another
country that is typically experiencing, or at risk of, internal conflict—
encompasses a wide range of stabilization and governance activities,
from counterterrorism to overseeing elections to training indigenous
troops, and includes relatively nonviolent peacekeeping missions, such
as those in Bosnia and Kosovo during the 1990s, together with sustained
counterinsurgency operations, such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq
during the early part of this century.
Resistance to prolonged nation-building partly reflects the striking
costs of the counterinsurgency campaigns in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and
Iraq. Moreover, the US military traditionally regards soldiers as warriors
rather than as nation-builders, and views stabilization operations as

1      Donald J. Trump, “Remarks at Youngstown State University” (speech, Youngstown, Ohio,
August 15, 2016), www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=119503.
2      Politico Staff, “Full Text: Donald Trump’s Speech on Fighting Terrorism,” Politico, August
15, 2016.
3      Rex W. Tillerson, “Remarks at the Global Coalition against ISIS” (speech, Washington, DC,
March 22, 2017), https://bh.usembassy.gov/tillerson-addresses-coalition-68-nations-defeat-isis/.
4      US Office of Management and Budget (OMB), America First: A Budget Blueprint to Make
America Great Again (Washington, DC: OMB, 2017).
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a distraction from its primary job of fighting conventional interstate
wars.5 The principle of civilian control of the military may also produce
skepticism about granting governing authority to US soldiers, even
in a foreign country. 6 Nation-building missions are consistently less
popular with the public than interstate wars. Indeed, the term nationbuilding is a highly pejorative phrase in the United States. Liberals often
associate nation-building with hawkish neoconservatism or imperialism.
Meanwhile, conservatives sometimes view nation-building as big
government welfare, a diplomatic “Obamacare.” 7
In recent decades, many prominent foreign policy doctrines—the
Nixon Doctrine, the Weinberger-Powell doctrine, the Lake doctrine, the
Rumsfeld doctrine, and the Obama doctrine—were animated to a large
extent by the wish to use force without enduring endless stabilization
operations. If this quandary is perennial, it is also intractable. For half a
century, America’s involvement in nation-building has been pervasive:
modern warfare is overwhelmingly characterized by civil wars, and
therefore, virtually any US military operation involves a stabilization
component. Indeed, the quest for a doctrine to employ force without
prolonged nation-building is an illusory endeavor that may actually raise
the odds of a quagmire.

Dueling Doctrines

In the late 1960s, Richard Nixon faced a fundamental predicament.
As a hawkish Republican, the president sought to wield force to deter and
to defeat adversaries around the world. But in the wake of the Vietnam
War, with over 25,000 American fatalities and an increasingly restive
Congress and public, the United States needed to avoid large-scale
counterinsurgency campaigns in areas of secondary strategic interest. In
July 1969, the president outlined a solution—the Nixon Doctrine—that
placed primary responsibility for internal threats and nation-building on
local allies.8 The Nixon Doctrine became the basis for the Vietnamization
policy to withdraw US troops from South Vietnam while simultaneously
stepping up training and material assistance for Saigon’s military.
During the early 1980s, Secretary of Defense Caspar Willard
Weinberger, together with his aide (and later chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff) Colin Powell, faced the same fundamental challenge
of waging war without prolonged nation-building. In the wake of the
traumatic experience in Vietnam, as well as the costly US peacekeeping
operation in Lebanon from 1982 to 1984 in which a car bomb struck
the Marine barracks and killed 241 Americans, the Weinberger-Powell

5      Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy
(New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1973), 36.
6      Nadia Schadlow, War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017).
7      Dominic Tierney, How We Fight: Crusades, Quagmires, and the American Way of War (New York:
Little Brown, 2010); and Bruce Jentleson, “The Pretty Prudent Public: Post-Vietnam American
Opinion on the Use of Military Force,” International Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1 (March 1992): 49–73,
doi:10.2307/2600916.
8      Richard Nixon, “Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen” (remarks, Top O’ the Mar
Officer’s Club, Guam, July 25, 1969), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2140.
This principle was later formalized in a speech on November 3, 1969, and a White House document
in 1970 entitled “Peace through Partnership—The Nixon Doctrine.”
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doctrine provided a solution.9 This doctrine outlined six principles to
assess the wisdom of prospective military operations: (1) vital US or
allied interests should be involved, (2) Washington should be committed
to winning, (3) clear and achievable objectives must exist, (4) the size
of the forces should continually be adjusted according to the goals, (5)
there ought to be a reasonable assurance of public and congressional
support, and (6) force should be used as a last resort.10
These tests would filter out most nation-building missions, where
the objectives are typically vague and a victory cannot easily be defined.
Furthermore, humanitarian or peacekeeping operations tend not to
involve core American interests and are often unpopular with Congress
and the public. Instead, only conventional interstate wars, such as the
Persian Gulf War (1991), would dependably qualify.
Weinberger believed if the tests were satisfied, the United States
should mobilize its full might to win: “When it is necessary for our
troops to be committed to combat, we must commit them, in sufficient
numbers and we must support them, as effectively and resolutely as our
strength permits.” 11 By carefully parsing prospective military operations,
the United States could avoid stabilization missions, such as those in
Vietnam and Lebanon, and win decisive interstate campaigns.
The Clinton administration signaled greater willingness to use force
to protect human rights and to promote democracy. But in the wake of
the “Black Hawk Down” firefight in Somalia (1993), which led to the
deaths of 18 American soldiers during a humanitarian operation, the
administration also sought to limit the risk of lengthy nation-building.
The Pentagon stressed, “The primary mission of our Armed Forces is
not peace operations; it is to deter and, if necessary, to fight and win
conflicts in which our most important interests are threatened.” 12 The
answer, insisting on a withdrawal plan before any stabilization mission
began, can be termed the Lake doctrine, after National Security Advisor
Tony Lake. In 1996, Lake described an “exit strategy doctrine,” where
the United States should only send troops abroad if it knows “how and
when we’re going to get them out.” 13 This doctrine did not apply to
interstate wars or deterring external aggression but specifically targeted
stabilization missions where “tightly tailored military missions and
sharp withdrawal deadlines must be the norm.” 14
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the George W.
Bush administration sought to engage in expansive military operations,
preemptively and unilaterally if necessary, to defeat terrorists and their
state patrons. At the same time, US policymakers were strongly averse
9      Kenneth J. Campbell, “Once Burned, Twice Cautious: Explaining the Weinberger-Powell
Doctrine,” Armed Forces and Society 24, no. 3 (April 1998): 357–74, doi:10.1177/0095327X9802400302.
10     Caspar Weinberger, “The Uses of Military Power” (remarks, National Press Club, Washington,
DC, November 28, 1984), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/force
/weinberger.html.
11      Weinberger, “Uses of Military Power” (emphasis in the original).
12      White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC:
White House, 1996), 23.
13      Anthony Lake, “Defining Missions, Setting Deadlines: Meeting New Security Challenges
in the Post-Cold War World” (speech, George Washington University, Washington, DC, March 6,
1996), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/force/lake/html.
14      Lake, “Defining Missions”; and David Fitzgerald, Learning to Forget: US Army Counterinsurgency
Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), 102.
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to Clinton-era stabilization missions in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and
elsewhere, which were seen as armed social work. “Let me tell you
what else I’m worried about,” said Bush in 2000, “I’m worried about
an opponent who uses nation-building and the military in the same
sentence.” 15 In 2003, on the eve of the Iraq War, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld gave a speech entitled “Beyond Nation-Building” that
criticized the drawn-out peacekeeping operation in Kosovo for creating
a “culture of dependence.” 16
The Rumsfeld doctrine tried to reconcile these goals through
a policy of transformation that would provide a new generation of
communications systems, smart bombs, and stealth weapons, enabling
Washington to strike adversaries with shock and awe before quickly
passing the baton to local allies or international troops, thereby avoiding
the drudgery of nation-building. Armed with this approach, the United
States toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001 using a few
hundred Special Forces personnel, backed by airpower and local allies,
and then handed security responsibilities to Afghan warlords, tribal
militia, and a modest international force. A year later, just 10,000
US soldiers were engaged in a narrow counterterrorism mission in
Afghanistan, while 5,000 international troops tried to help the new
regime in Kabul stabilize the country.17 Similarly, in 2003, the United
States planned an invasion to overthrow Saddam Hussein, “stand up a
government in Iraq and get out as fast as we can.” 18
The Obama administration faced a familiar strategic quandary.
On one hand, Barack Obama committed to using force to deter and to
defeat adversaries, especially al-Qaeda and its affiliated networks. But
guided by the principle of “no more Iraq Wars,” the president sought
“the end of long-term nation-building with large military footprints.” 19
The Obama doctrine tried to resolve these aims through limited warfare.
Military operations would be limited in number (with greater selectivity
about intervening abroad), limited in cost (by “leading from behind”
and sharing the burden with international and local allies), and limited
in scope (by utilizing raids, cyberwarfare, and drone strikes rather than
significant numbers of ground troops).20
The Obama doctrine shaped both force planning and military
strategy. In 2012 the Pentagon stated, “U.S. forces will no longer be
sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.”  21 Obama
15      Terry M. Neal, “Bush Backs into Nation Building,” Washington Post, February 26, 2003; and
James Dobbins et al., After the War: Nation-Building from FDR to George W. Bush (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 2008), 91.
16      Donald H. Rumsfeld “Beyond Nation-Building” (speech, Salute to Freedom, Intrepid SeaAir-Space Museum, New York, New York, February 14, 2003), www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate
/dod/sp20030214-secdef0024.htm.
17      David H. Ucko, The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 57.
18      Toby Dodge, “Iraq,” in Exit Strategies and State Building, ed. Richard Caplan (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2012), 246.
19      Dominic Tierney, The Obama Doctrine and the Lessons of Iraq (Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy
Research Institute, 2012); Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on the Defense Strategic
Review” (speech, Pentagon, Washington, DC, January 5, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov
/the-press-office/2012/01/05/remarks-president-defense-strategic-review.
20      Ryan Lizza, “The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring Remade Obama’s Foreign Policy,”
New Yorker, May 2, 2011.
21      US Department of Defense (DoD), Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century
Defense (Washington, DC: DoD, 2012), 6.
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followed the Bush administration’s exit timetable in Iraq by withdrawing
combat forces in late 2011. During the Libya Revolt of 2011, Washington
intervened as part of a broad coalition, but primarily employed airpower
and rejected any nation-building by American troops. In 2009, Obama
backed a surge of troops in Afghanistan, but soon became disillusioned
by the slow rate of progress and decided to withdraw almost all US
forces from the country by the end of 2014. “The fever in this room has
finally broken,” Obama told a meeting of the National Security Council
in 2015, “We’re no longer in nation-building mode.” 22
Of course, the puzzle of how to employ force effectively, without
getting bogged down in a nation-building quagmire, was not the only
consideration behind these doctrines. The Weinberger-Powell doctrine,
for instance, aimed to restore the US military as an institution after
Vietnam. Policymakers also sought to avoid all forms of protracted and
inconclusive war, including prolonged interstate campaigns, through
the large-scale deployment of manpower (Weinberger-Powell) or new
technologies (Rumsfeld).
But limiting US exposure to nation-building was a common theme
weaving these doctrines together. First, avoiding prolonged warfare
typically means avoiding prolonged nation-building. The United States
has not experienced a protracted interstate war (relative to initial
expectations) since the Korean War, but it has endured drawn-out nationbuilding campaigns in Vietnam, Lebanon, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo,
Afghanistan, and Iraq. Second, the authors of the doctrines explicitly,
and repeatedly, rejected lengthy stabilization missions. Indeed, it is hard
to find other foreign policy principles that were stated so consistently
across the ideological spectrum. Third, each doctrine was triggered by a
negative nation-building experience: Vietnam for the Nixon Doctrine,
Vietnam and Lebanon for the Weinberger-Powell doctrine, Somalia for
the Lake doctrine, the Clinton-era missions for the Rumsfeld doctrine,
and Iraq for the Obama doctrine.
In some respects, the doctrines overlap. The Nixon Doctrine, the
Rumsfeld doctrine, and the Obama doctrine, for example, favor handing
responsibility in stabilization campaigns to local allies. But there are also
significant differences. The Nixon Doctrine, the Weinberger-Powell
doctrine, and the Obama doctrine are fundamentally entry strategies
designed to avert a potential quagmire through the careful selection of
military operations, whereas the Lake doctrine seeks to identify an exit
strategy and a timetable for withdrawal. Meanwhile, the Lake doctrine
foresaw the United States playing a role in peace operations but sought
to regulate this involvement tightly, whereas the Weinberger-Powell
doctrine and the Rumsfeld doctrine attempted to curtail starkly, or even
end, US involvement in peacekeeping efforts.

The Day After

How successful were the doctrines? They contributed to one
overarching problem of failing to prepare for nation-building, and
they produced a number of particular dilemmas: state collapse, wishful
thinking, abandonment, overcommitment, and improvisation. We can

22      Mark Landler, “The Afghan War and the Evolution of Obama,” New York Times, January
1, 2017.
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illustrate these challenges by considering the three major US wars after
9/11: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya.
Collectively, the doctrines encouraged the dangerous illusion that
nation-building can somehow be avoided and, therefore, significant
preparation is unnecessary. Since the Vietnam War, nation-building has
been a ubiquitous experience for the US military—Panama in 1989, Iraq
I (northern Iraq) in 1991, Somalia in 1992, Haiti in 1994, Bosnia in 1995,
Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq II (post-Saddam) in 2003,
and Iraq III (resisting the Islamic State) in 2014—because the character
of global warfare changed from interstate war to civil war.
After World War II, nuclear deterrence, democratization, international institutions, and globalization, diminished the incidence of
interstate war, but internal conflict did not end. As a result, about nine
of ten wars during the post-Cold War era were civil wars, including
prominent contemporary conflicts in Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Libya,
Yemen, and Somalia.23 Civil wars also became the main arena for
interstate military competition, in the form of proxy wars, where
countries back rival insurgent or government actors. Given this
strategic environment, almost any conceivable use of ground forces—
humanitarian, peacekeeping, and counterterrorism interventions—will
have a significant nation-building component, where troops seek to
bolster a friendly regime and restore order.
Despite this experience, foreign policy doctrines encouraged the view
that nation-building was a deviation from the US military’s true vocation
of fighting and winning interstate wars. Rather than institutionalize
lessons from prior interventions, American officials tended to view such
operations as a mistake never to be repeated. Following the Vietnam
War, the Army destroyed its material on counterinsurgency held at Fort
Bragg, North Carolina, and planned for an interstate war against the
Soviet Union in Europe.
During the 1990s, the US military focused its professional education
on conventional interstate contests such as the Gulf War. Stabilization
missions were given the second class status of MOOTW, military
operations other than war. Officials looked to pass off governance tasks
to specialized units in the special operations community, as well as
civilian agencies and international allies—any entity other than the core
US military. In 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates described
how sidelining unconventional war “left the service unprepared to deal
with the operations that followed: Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, and more
recently Afghanistan and Iraq—the consequences and costs of which
we are still struggling with today.” 24
Each doctrine also created particular risks. First, the Rumsfeld
doctrine simultaneously sought to expand the use of force in a global
war on terror and to minimize America’s involvement in nationbuilding. Underpinning this policy was the heroic assumption that when
US troops march away from the smoking ruins, local and international
actors will somehow cooperate to produce a political order compatible
23      John A. Vasquez, ed., What Do We Know about War? (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield,
2012), 263.
24      Robert Gates (speech, Association of the United States Army, Washington, DC, October 10,
2007), http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1181.
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with American interests—and the day after will be preferable to the day
before. An obvious danger is disintegration: toppling regimes and then
withdrawing at maximum speed produces an array of collapsed states.25
Indeed, the Rumsfeld doctrine triggered two prolonged quagmires in
Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2001, the Bush administration was determined
to overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and equally committed
to avoid nation-building. After the Taliban fled south, the White House
wanted to stay out of Afghan politics. The lack of international forces
curtailed Kabul’s ability to provide basic services and led to a predictable
Taliban recovery. By 2006, the insurgents controlled much of southern
Afghanistan, and the prospect of decisive success had evaporated.
Meanwhile in Iraq, the enticing notion of moving beyond nationbuilding meant invading with no viable plan for postconflict stabilization,
and too few troops to prevent widespread looting or the collapse of Iraqi
institutions. As Iraq unraveled during 2003 and 2004, the White House
stuck to its “small footprint” preferences by pursuing a “leave-to-win”
withdrawal plan based on handing over power to Iraqi exiles, reducing
US troop levels (which fell from 148,000 soldiers in May 2003 to
108,000 soldiers in January 2004), and maintaining the existing force in
forward operating bases far removed from the Iraqi people. The spiral of
violence worsened as local rebellions melded into a broader insurgency.26
The Nixon Doctrine’s emphasis on handing over responsibility for
internal threats to local allies is, in many respects, eminently defensible.
Compared to American soldiers, indigenous troops may be more
culturally aware, more likely to be seen as legitimate by the local people,
and far cheaper to deploy. The problem lies precisely in this policy’s
seductive appeal. The United States is often faced by two unpalatable
choices: take responsibility for nation-building or face mission failure.
Training and advising programs offer an attractive third path of leaving
without losing. Since the alternatives are too wretched to contemplate,
officials may become overconfident about the speed and the ease of
boosting local forces.
Creating indigenous security forces, however, is an extremely vulnerable process. To borrow from Tolstoy, all successful training programs
are alike; every unsuccessful training program fails in its own way. In
other words, effective educational endeavors must check a number of
boxes, and botching any single element can doom the entire exercise.
Training programs may founder due to sectarian divisions, corruption,
or a local regime that is more interested in “coup proofing” its military
by promoting political lackeys, rather than creating an effective fighting
force that could evolve into a rival power center. Indeed, transferring
responsibility to local allies is especially difficult in the toughest national
security challenges, which arise precisely because capable allied forces
are absent. Furthermore, the centrality of training and advising in US
strategy is not matched by an appropriate degree of resourcing. These
programs are often neglected in peacetime and may be moved center
stage only when the United States is eager to withdraw from war. For
25      Hal Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S.
Truman to George W. Bush (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014).
26      Dodge, “Iraq,” 249.
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one thing, the US military traditionally sees advising as a relatively lowstatus occupation.
Nixon’s policy of Vietnamization transformed South Vietnam’s
air force into the fourth largest in the world. But poor leadership and
high desertion rates eroded Saigon’s military effectiveness, and in 1975,
a North Vietnamese conventional invasion overran the South in just
two months. Training local forces was also seen as the ticket out of
Afghanistan and Iraq. “As the Iraqis stand up,” said Bush, “we will stand
down.” 27 And as with Vietnamization three decades before, “Iraqization”
and “Afghanization” did not produce the intended results. Instead, there
was systematic wishful thinking about the time and resources required
to build capable local forces.
In the early years of the Iraq War, David Petraeus oversaw a crash
program to train Iraqi troops and to smooth America’s departure. As
the violence worsened, recruits often defected to the insurgency or
moonlighted as death squads. Petraeus compared the training mission
to constructing an aircraft in flight while under fire. During 2014,
after a decade of investment, the Islamic State routed Iraqi security
forces in northern Iraq and captured hundreds of millions of dollars
of US-supplied equipment. Meanwhile, Washington was slow to invest
the necessary training resources in Afghanistan. By 2006, the Afghan
National Army had fewer than 20,000 deployable troops, and a target
size of only 70,000 men, which can be contrasted with the Obama
administration’s later and more credible plan for a combined Afghan
army and police force totaling 352,000.
Would it have been wise to invade Afghanistan and Iraq with a predetermined departure date? The answer is no, which gets at the problem
with the Lake doctrine. Demanding a timeline for withdrawal at the
start of a nation-building mission may prevent a flexible response to
conditions, turn American soldiers into lame ducks who keep checking
their watches, and encourage enemies to bide their time until the
scheduled departure. Missions can end up resembling what Gideon Rose
called “moon landings,” where the United States transports troops to
a distant location, and then aims to bring them home safely, without
regard for what is left behind.28 Although there was not a predetermined
exit date in the Afghanistan and Iraq operations, the original invasion
plan called for US troop levels in Iraq to be reduced to just 30,000 by
September 2003, which was wildly unrealistic and fortunately revised.
In many respects, the Iraq War validated the Weinberger-Powell
doctrine because a fair application of the tests would have filtered out
the operation itself, which was not fought in pursuit of vital interests and
was far from a last resort, as well as the invasion plan, which lacked clear
objectives or appropriate force levels. Weinberger-Powell’s virtual exclusion of stabilization operations is dangerous, however, in a strategic environment where war means civil war and American interests and values
require some nation-building. Furthermore, the doctrine’s commitment
to victory could also invite a quagmire. According to Weinberger, after
27      John D. Banusiewicz, “ ‘As Iraqis Stand Up, We Will Stand Down,’ Bush Tells Nation,”
American Forces Press Service, June 28, 2005.
28      Gideon Rose, “The Exit Strategy Delusion,” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 1 (January/February
1998): 56–67.

TOC

Illusions of Victory

Tierney

33

deploying US troops, “we must support those forces to the fullest extent
of our national will for as long as it takes to win.” 29 But if a campaign
deteriorates, Washington may need to reassess the original goals and
possibly pursue a substitute for victory. Both Afghanistan and Iraq
became unwinnable in the sense that a decisive victory could not be
achieved at a tolerable price. In such cases, to have fought “for as long
as it takes to win” would have involved grave sacrifice in pursuit of
uncertain ends.
The Obama doctrine was designed to avoid an Iraqi-style scenario
of prolonged nation-building by a large number of US forces. But the
limited-war model might encourage a short-term and improvisational
view of war that neglects the political endgame. During military operations, the White House may be reluctant to think too many steps ahead
because creating a credible plan for postconflict stabilization could draw
the United States into an unwanted nation-building commitment. In
other words, a doctrine based on fighting a limited number of wars, in a
limited manner, may also produce a limited horizon.
In Libya during 2011, the Obama doctrine encouraged a short-term
mindset focused on toppling Muammar Gadhafi’s regime, rather than
planning seriously for the aftermath. Here, avoiding Iraqi-style nationbuilding led to Iraqi-style disorder. Libya collapsed into chaos and rival
militias feuded for power. In 2014, Obama explicitly recognized that
the desire to avert nation-building had triggered a fiasco: “We [and]
our European partners underestimated the need to come in full force if
you’re going to do this . . . there has to be a much more aggressive effort to rebuild societies that didn’t have any civic traditions.”  30 Later,
he described “failing to plan for the day after” in Libya as the “worst
mistake” of his presidency.31
Recent successful cases of US nation-building often deviated from
these foreign policy doctrines. In 1995, following the Dayton Accords,
the United States contributed troops to a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Four years later, after an air campaign against
Serbia, US forces joined a similar international mission in Kosovo.
From a doctrinal perspective, the operations were deeply problematic.
Rumsfeld explicitly rejected peacekeeping in the Balkans as an inappropriate use of the American military. The missions in Bosnia and
Kosovo also failed the Weinberger-Powell tests because US interests
were not vital, the objectives were vague, and the American public was
fairly skeptical. In addition, the Lake doctrine’s requirement for a sharp
withdrawal deadline was not satisfied. The original proposal for US
forces to depart Bosnia after one year was abandoned, and American
troops left the country in 2005. Nevertheless, by any reasonable
standard, these missions succeeded. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Kosovo remain socially divided, US forces helped to stabilize the
Balkans, prevent the renewal of civil war, and facilitate the return of
Kosovar Albanian refugees—all with zero American fatalities.
29      Weinberger, “Uses of Military Power.”
30      Thomas L. Friedman, “Obama on the World: President Obama Talks to Thomas L. Friedman
about Iraq, Putin and Israel,” New York Times, August 8, 2014.
31      “Exclusive: President Barack Obama on ‘Fox News Sunday’,” Fox News, April 10, 2016,
http://www.foxnews.com/transcript/2016/04/10/exclusive-president-barack-obama-on-fox
-news-sunday.html.
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The surge strategy in Iraq was a stark rejection of the Rumsfeld
doctrine. In late 2006, Rumsfeld resigned as secretary of defense and
was replaced by Gates. In 2007, Bush deployed over 20,000 extra US
troops to Iraq, and appointed a new commander, Petraeus, who adopted
a set of tactics known as population-centric counterinsurgency, where
troops lived and patrolled closer to the people, provincial reconstruction
teams were embedded in combat units, alliances were developed with
Sunni tribes to fight al-Qaeda, and firepower was employed selectively
but effectively against irreconcilables. Whereas Rumsfeld had yearned to
move beyond nation-building, Petraeus oversaw the publication of the
2006 Counterinsurgency manual, which declared “Soldiers and Marines are
expected to be nation builders as well as warriors.” 32 The result in Iraq
was not a victory: the costs of war had risen too steeply and the country
remained extremely fragile. But Iraq was pulled back from the cliff edge,
and violence fell sharply after the summer of 2007.

Conclusions and Implications

Richard Nixon, Caspar Weinberger, Colin Powell, Tony Lake,
Donald Rumsfeld, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump have little in
common in terms of their political ideology. But they all wrestled with
the same fundamental puzzle: how to wage war without endless nationbuilding. The emerging Trump doctrine is not simply an idiosyncratic
reflection of Trump’s political beliefs and the challenges of the post-Iraq
War era. It is also the latest attempt to solve an endemic strategic problem.
Since the 1960s, American officials have proposed a range of
solutions: (1) hand over responsibility to allies, (2) establish tests to filter
out nation-building missions, (3) create a predetermined exit strategy, (4)
pursue military transformation, (5) engage in limited warfare, and in the
emerging Trump doctrine, (6) adopt a kinetic posture.
None of the doctrines cracked the riddle, however, and nationbuilding remained a core part of the US military experience. Indeed, the
belief that a template for clean war exists encouraged strategic failure in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. The doctrines ignore a difficult truth: in
a world where 90 percent of wars are civil wars, using force means nation-building.
Officials should accept the inherent relationship between military
operations and stabilization endeavors and seek to manage the associated
risks. The goal is to develop the American military into an institution
that is exceptionally skilled at nation-building and then utilize this
capability with great discretion.
The first step is to reject the notion that nation-building is a secondary endeavor compared to conventional interstate war. Instead,
Washington should enhance its stabilization capabilities, for example,
through improved cultural and language training programs, investment
in engineers and special operations forces, and institutional learning
from past counterinsurgency operations. Here, there are hopeful signs.
The Army’s decision to regionally align its brigades should improve
soldiers’ awareness of local culture and languages. But there are also
worrying indications of a backlash against nation-building, similar to

32      Headquarters, US Department of the Army (HQDA), foreword to Counterinsurgency, Field
Manual 3-24 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2006).
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the post-Vietnam era—for example, the decision in 2014 to close the
Army Irregular Warfare Center.33
Certain aspects of each doctrine provide useful strategic guidance.
As Nixon proposed, where possible, the United States ought to let allied troops take the lead in combatting internal threats. According to
the US counterinsurgency manual, “The host nation doing something
tolerably is normally better than us doing it well.” 34 The degree of
investment in training programs, as well as the status and career
incentives accorded to American educators, should reflect the centrality
of this task in military strategy. In wartime, training operations should
begin early, rather than be hastily enacted when the United States is
already looking to exit. And there are numerous specific lessons that
Washington can learn from the last two decades of warfare, such as
the importance of creating communally mixed forces where all ethnic
groups are represented.
Many of the Weinberger-Powell tests are highly valuable in judging
the wisdom of military operations, especially the focus on assessing
interests, identifying clear objectives, and fighting as a last resort. Two
major wars of the last half century—Vietnam and Iraq—should never
have been fought and could have been filtered out with an appropriate
application of Weinberger-Powell. The importance of identifying
achievable goals is particularly critical because the United States often
goes to war with a moralistic view of the mission as good versus evil,
which encourages idealistic objectives of creating a beacon of freedom.
A more appropriate aim in an impoverished and divided society, such
as Afghanistan or Iraq, is ugly stability, where an insurgency is managed
rather than entirely suppressed and concessions are made to draw rebels
into a peace process. The Weinberger-Powell all-or-nothing approach
should be loosened, however, to allow for missions like peacekeeping in
the Balkans, which offer significant benefits at low risk, and to qualify
the notion of winning at all costs, particularly if a mission deteriorates.
We might also pose additional questions of prospective operations,
such as considering the potential for unanticipated consequences and
identifying traps that could derail the use of force.
The Obama doctrine rightly emphasized the value of multilateralism
when nation-building. Acting in concert with multiple states who have
different rules of engagement generates numerous problems, evident,
for example, in Afghanistan. But the balance sheet of multilateralism
is strongly favorable because allies can share the burden in blood and
treasure, provide intelligence and bases, and crucially, enhance the
global legitimacy of the operation, thereby reducing the flow of external
aid to rebels, which is vital to an insurgency’s success.
Limiting US military operations, however, cannot mean simply
improvising things day-to-day. What happens after Kabul, Baghdad, or
Tripoli—or Mosul or Raqqa—falls? Who rules and in what ways? What
kind of governance will deliver a better peace? Here, the Lake doctrine
has value by focusing attention on the exit strategy. But rather than
fixate on a deadline for US withdrawal, it is wiser to identify an endgame.
33      For a broader discussion, see Isaiah Wilson III and Scott Smitson, “Solving America’s GrayZone Puzzle,” Parameters 46, no. 4 (Winter 2016–17): 55–67.
34      HQDA, FM 3-24, 1-27.
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In other words, officials should carefully identify the characteristics of
enduring political success while retaining a flexible time frame.
The deterioration of security in both Afghanistan and Iraq may be
a damning indictment of the Rumsfeld light-footprint model. Indeed,
there is little point in overthrowing a tyrant if the result is chaos. But
transformation technologies, including communication systems and
smart weaponry, have an essential role in nation-building operations, for
example, by facilitating precise air strikes that limit collateral damage.
American airpower can be a strategic game changer in civil wars, routing
the Taliban in 2001 and pushing back the Islamic State after 2014. The
key is to recognize the limits of technology. The US military can hit
almost anything with pinpoint accuracy, but what if soldiers cannot see
the enemy?
By accepting that fighting means nation-building and by combining
elements of the different foreign policy doctrines, the United States can
maneuver more successfully through an age of civil wars.
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